Cultural Relativism’s Veiled Ugliness

C ultural relativism, once a critical tool confined to the walls of academia for scrutinising ethnocentrism and colonial hegemony, has become increasingly controversial in pluralistic societies today. While it emerged as a means of promoting tolerance and respect for cultural diversity, it has also given rise to significant ethical dilemmas — especially in contexts where conflicting value systems coexist. In multicultural societies committed to liberal democratic ideals, the unchecked application of cultural relativism can undermine social cohesion, inhibit moral critique, and obstruct universal human rights.
In nations like Canada, the United States, and England, arguably some of the most pluralistic countries in the world, is it possible that these manifestations pose significant dangers to ethical consistency, human rights advocacy, and the functioning of culturally plural societies? In praxis, does a theoretical position like cultural relativism actually result in a harmonious, diverse co-existence, or can it create value divides that are deeply unsettling to the foundational principles of our communities? In light of the cultural clashes we are seeing across the West, it appears that the lofty idea of cultural relativism should have stayed safely in our graduate classrooms.
Modern cultural relativism draws heavily from postmodern philosophy, which arose in the late 20th century as a reaction against the Enlightenment’s emphasis on rationality, objectivity, and universalism. Thinkers such as Michel Foucault challenged dominant epistemologies by ‘deconstructing’ the ways in which knowledge is said to be produced and sustained through power. Foucault’s concept of power-knowledge asserts that truth is not objective but constructed through discourse and legitimised by social institutions.
In this framework, individuals are not autonomous agents with access to universal truths but are socially constructed products of particular discursive and historical contexts. Consequently, moral norms are seen not as universal principles but as culturally embedded beliefs that vary across societies. Postmodernism’s rejection of grand narratives and universal ethics thus feeds directly into cultural relativism’s central claim: no culture can rightfully judge the values or practices of another.
While this perspective has been theoretically useful in conversations discussing colonial ideologies and highlighting the situational nature of knowledge, it also poses substantial risks when applied uncritically—especially in plural societies where differing cultural norms regularly intersect. If cultures attempt to co-exist, but cannot challenge one another, discuss an agreed-upon set of values and principles, and subsequently opt not to assimilate enough to integrate into the pre-existing fabric of a country, plurality becomes disastrous.
Internal Contradictions
Cultural relativism purports to promote tolerance by refraining from making moral judgements across cultural lines. However, in practice, this often leads to a paralysis of moral judgement, where even the most egregious violations of human dignity are left unchallenged for fear of appearing ethnocentric or culturally imperialist. This becomes especially problematic in pluralistic societies, where multiple cultural frameworks coexist within the same legal and political structure. If cultural practices are to be respected simply because they are culturally specific, then liberal democratic societies face an internal contradiction: they must simultaneously uphold values such as gender equality, freedom of expression, and individual rights, while refraining from critiquing cultural practices that directly violate these values.
For example, should a liberal society tolerate gender-based violence, forced marriage, or religious extremism under the banner of ‘cultural tolerance’? If all moral standards are relative, there exists no rational basis to condemn such practices. This creates an environment in which cultural identity is privileged over individual rights, ultimately harming the very people cultural relativism seeks to protect.
At the heart of cultural relativism lies moral relativism, the idea that morality is not universal but culturally contingent. This position holds that no moral system is objectively better than another, and therefore, no one has the authority to impose their values beyond their cultural context. While intellectually provocative, this theory is ethically destabilising.
In plural societies, moral relativism erodes the common ethical foundation necessary for peaceful coexistence. It denies the possibility of shared values and hinders the creation of legal and political frameworks that transcend cultural divisions. For instance, if a culture practices female genital mutilation (FGM), and another condemns it as a human-rights violation, relativism insists that both positions are equally valid. This not only undermines the efforts of international human rights organizations but also ignores the voices of dissidents within those cultures who seek reform.
Furthermore, relativism often collapses into cultural essentialism, reducing individuals to passive carriers of cultural traditions. It fails to account for internal dissent, resistance, or the evolving nature of cultural identities. In doing so, it stifles debate and limits the agency of those most affected by oppressive cultural norms. A lthough Foucault is often cited in support of relativist positions, his own work reveals a more nuanced perspective. Foucault acknowledged that restrictions and boundaries are inevitable in any society. He emphasised the importance of allowing individuals the means to contest and transform the constraints they live under. In a 1982 interview, he argued: ‘A system of constraint becomes truly intolerable when the individuals who are affected by it don’t have the means of modifying it.’
This implies that cultures or societies must be open to internal critique and transformation, and that unquestioning adherence to tradition is not a defensible moral stance. Foucault even invoked the figure of the necrophiliac to illustrate that not all desires or practices can or should be accommodated. There are, in other words, limits to tolerance.
Thus, to invoke Foucault in defense of total relativism is to misrepresent his philosophical commitments. He was concerned not with protecting cultural norms at all costs, but with empowering individuals to reshape the discourses and structures that govern their lives. This is fundamentally incompatible with a moral framework that refuses to engage in ethical critique across cultural lines.
While moral relativism might function as a provocative theoretical stance in academic discourse, it proves incoherent and untenable when applied to real-world ethical dilemmas. As Sam Harris has illustrated in an old debate on morality, few people are genuinely willing to defend practices such as torture, religiously sanctioned violence, or systemic oppression if they were to imagine themselves as the victim. This thought experiment mirrors John Rawls’ famous ‘veil of ignorance’: if you did not know where, how, or into what culture you would be born, what kind of society would you want to inherit?
Relativism falters when subjected to this kind of universal empathy. Most people, regardless of culture, value safety, autonomy, dignity, and fairness. These shared aspirations suggest the possibility of cross-cultural moral principles—not in the service of imposing hegemony, but in defense of universal human flourishing.
Pluralism vs. Relativism
It is essential to distinguish between pluralism and relativism. Pluralism is the recognition and respectful engagement of diverse cultures within a shared political and moral framework. It requires negotiation, compromise, and commitment to certain non-negotiable ethical standards, such as human rights and equal protection under the law.
Relativism, by contrast, insists that each culture’s norms are equally valid and beyond critique. In pluralistic societies, this stance leads to fragmentation, social incoherence, and the erosion of shared civic values. It allows cultural practices that harm individuals to go unchallenged and marginalises reformers within those communities.
Pluralism supports critical engagement across cultures and emphasises the need for some sort of assimilation or submission to agreed-upon values. It recognises the need to address cultural injustices—whether within dominant or minority communities—through open dialogue, legal protections, and moral reasoning. In doing so, it respects both diversity and individual dignity, striking a necessary balance that relativism cannot achieve. C ultural relativism arose as a response to centuries of imperial domination and continues to play a role in guarding against cultural arrogance and ethnocentrism. Its contributions to postcolonial theory and the decolonisation of knowledge are certainly valid in the academic realm. However, when uncritically applied—especially in the context of multicultural, democratic societies—cultural relativism becomes a barrier to justice.
To build equitable, safe, and inclusive societies, we must move beyond moral relativism. This does not mean abandoning cultural sensitivity or falling back into ethnocentric universalism. Rather, it means embracing a critical pluralism—one that values cultural diversity, but not at the expense of individual rights or human dignity.
Dogmatic adherence to relativism undermines meaningful cross-cultural dialogue and leaves the most vulnerable without protection. The challenge before us is not to retreat into illogical relativism, but to cultivate a human-centered ethic—rooted in empathy, reason, and the shared goal of global human flourishing.
William Horton is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in education